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WHY MORTGAGE "FORMALITIES"
MATTER
David A. Dana
INTRODUCTION
B efore the current foreclosure crisis, legal commentators andacademics, not to mention the news media, paid almost no
attention to the law surrounding residential foreclosures and
foreclosure actions. But in the recent crisis, precisely because
foreclosing parties quite often seem to violate them, such laws have
become the subject of substantial attention. While the extent of
unlawful behavior remains unknown, it appears that "robo-signing"
of notice and certification documents has been a common practice on
the part of servicers and their law firms for years. Foreclosing parties
have instituted actions even before they acquire the mortgage and/or
the note that is allegedly in default. Sometimes the foreclosing parties
cannot even say who owns the mortgage that is being foreclosed.'
One reaction to this noncompliance with the law has been to
dismiss it as a matter of mere formalities - "mortgage formalities," if
you will. In this' account, there is no good reason to insist on
adherence to the various procedural requirements for effecting a valid
foreclosure as long as the economic substance behind the foreclosure
is what it should be in a foreclosure action - namely, that the
borrower is in default and cannot cure the default, and that the parties
that are legally due proceeds from the foreclosure sale eventually get
them. Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase, expressed the view,
"[w]e've known about these issues for a while [but] [w]e're not
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i See, e.g., Tim Reid, The U.S. Foreclosure Crisis, Beverly Hills-Style,
REUTERS.COM (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/16/us-usa-
housing-hills-idUSTRE81FOB520120216.
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evicting people who deserved to stay in their house."2 Or as another
commentator put it, "these homeowners [who ask banks to follow
proper procedures] are staying in their homes based on a
technicality." 3 According to this commentator, "[t]here is rarely any
dispute over whether or not they have stopped paying their
mortgage." 4  Indeed, according to this formalities-don't-matter
account, insisting that procedural and legal requirements are met is
actually socially counter-productive because it serves only to. slow
down the foreclosure process and delay the elimination of the huge
backlog of mortgages in default.s If defaulting borrowers cannot
afford to stay in their homes under their current mortgages, as the
story goes, better to get them out of there sooner rather than later so
that the housing market can clear. As one industry commentator
argued, "[t]he banks loose [sic] because they can't get the bad assets
off their books, the real estate industry looses [sic] because they can't
sell property, and most of all society looses [sic] not only because of
the blight of vacant homes in our neighborhoods, but because . .. we
need a strong housing sector, and that is not going to happen until we
get through these foreclosures." 6
But mortgage formalities (I will adopt that term, albeit
ironically) do matter, and they should matter. Arguably, we need
more of them. Hence, courts err in disregarding them as they have
sometimes done. Similarly, state legislatures err in eliminating
2 Colin Barr, Dimon Downplays Foreclosure Mess, CNNMONEY (Oct. 13,
2010), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2010/10/13/dimon-downplays-foreclosure-
mess/.
3 Les Christie, Foreclosure free ride: 3 years, no payments, CNNMONEY (Jan.
1, 2012), www.money.cnn.com/2011/12/28/realestate/foreclsoure/index.htm.
4 id.
5 See id. A related view is that many people undergoing foreclosure who
remain in their homes for years do not maintain their properties, further lowering
the property values in the neighborhood.
6 Bob Willett, What's up with stopping foreclosures?, SACRELENDER, (Oct. 12,
2010), www.sacrelender.com/?p=110. The hostility toward taking mortgage law
seriously also may reflect less a view about what the housing market needs to
recover and more pure resentment on the part of some Americans toward those they
perceive as "deadbeats" or recipients or special favors. Consider, in this regard,
how commentator's Rick Santelli's rant against borrowers who might avoid
foreclosure with the help of a proposed federal program went viral and even,
according to some, helped spawn the politically important Tea Party movement.
See Eric Etheridge, Rick Santelli: Tea Party Time, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2009),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/20/rick-santelli-tea-party-
time/?scp=1&sq=Eric%20Etheridge,%2Rick%2Santelli:%2Tea%2Party/o2OT
ime&st-cse.
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formalities from substantive law, as Florida did in its experiment with
"foreclosure courts." Additionally, state legislatures err by not
considering adding more mortgage formalities to the law than
traditionally have been in place - something no state is apparently
even considering doing (with the notable exception of new
8
mandatory mediation requirements). Further, state attorneys general
err in embracing a settlement that largely frees the banks from
liabilities for robo-signing and similar practices for a price that,
though large in absolute -terms, is paltry in the scheme of the
mortgage market.9 In sum, mortgage formalities have been largely
ignored and should not be considered "formalities" at all.
Why, then, do mortgage formalities matter? The answer has
three distinct parts. First, they matter because, in at least some cases,
they may help a homeowner rightfully stay in his home over the long
term rather than having to relocate. There is no way of knowing how
many homeowners genuinely would be helped by strict adherence to
the formalities; nevertheless, to build on the Jewish proverb that
saving one, life is the same as saving the whole world, if even one
homeowner retains his home, that is significant.
The second reason mortgage formalities matter lies in what
they express about society. Adherence to the formalities expresses the
significant value that the home serves in people's lives and the
vitality of communities.10 Moreover, adherence to the formalities
7 See Tami Luhby, Florida pulls plug on rocket-docket foreclosure courts,
CNNMONEY (May 25, 2011, 1:31 PM), www.money.cnn.com/2011/05/24/news/. It
is worth noting that, although the foreclosure courts drew criticism from the ACLU
and others, the Florida state legislature apparently de-funded them primarily for
budgetary reasons. Id.
8 See, e.g., Douglas S. Malan, Foreclosure Mediation Becomes Mandatory,
CONN. L. TRIB. (June 8, 2009), www.ctlawtribune.com/getarticle.aspx?id=33993. It
remains unclear whether mediation, whether voluntary or mandatory, has benefits
that justify its costs.
9 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, The Deal Is Done, but Hold the Applause,
N.Y. TIMES, February 11, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/business/mortgage-settlement-leaves-much-
to-be-desired-fair game.html?scp= 1 &sq=The%20Deal%201s%20Done,%20
But%20Hold%2OThe%2OApplause&st=cse. Some information regarding the
settlement is available at http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/. There is a
great deal of uncertainty over who will bear the costs provided for in the settlement,
and, in particular, how much any financial hit will be borne by the settling banks
and how much instead will be borne by investors in mortgages or by the federal
taxpayer.
'o Indeed, many areas of our law, such as the mortgage interest deduction and
the homestead exemption from bankruptcy, reflect recognition of the home as an
especially important form of property. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(o)(4) (2010).
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sends an important message about equality before the law, which is
one of our constitutive and constitutional values. Because the
mortgage formalities addressed herein are all designed to provide
some protection to borrowers/homeowners, disregarding these
formalities also communicates this message: the law will hold the
"little people" to strict compliance regarding their legal obligations
under mortgages and notes, while it excludes large financial
institutions like Chase and Citibank from their legal obligations when
they are inconvenient. There should be normative discomfort with the
message that corporations are treated more favorably than the men,
women, and children subject to residential foreclosures. 1 1
The third and perhaps most important way in which mortgage
formalities matter is that insistence upon following them - as well as
embracing more of them - might help prevent a repeat of the
foreclosure crisis that is currently wreaking havoc on most parts of
this country. There are substantial reasons to believe that the
aggressive practices of pooling, securitizing, and re-securitizing
mortgages has created a landscape in which many significant loan
modifications are not occurring, even though the modifications would
benefit both the owner(s) of the mortgage and the
borrower/homeowner.' 2 Strict adherence to mortgage formalities may
not prevent future aggressive securitization. However, it may create
an incentive for more care in the securitization process, which may
translate into fewer impediments to loan modifications. Moreover,
mortgage formalities, precisely because they increase the cost of
foreclosure, -may make it less attractive for a lender to lend or a
mortgage pool investor to invest where there is a significant risk that
the borrower(s) will not be able to make the mortgage payments. We
should want lenders and investors to think hard about that significant
risk and attempt to avoid it. Increasing the cost of foreclosure is at
least one way to encourage this.13 The current crisis has demonstrated
1 See David A. Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning Of Condemning The
Poor After Kelo, 101 Nw U. L. REv,. 365 (2011) (addressing the expressive
meaning of permitting blight takings affecting low-income households while
permitting economic development takings affecting middle-class households).
12 See David A. Dana, The Foreclosure Crisis and the Antifragmentation
Principle in State Property Law, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 97, 102 (2010). For very good
descriptions of precisely how servicer incentives can disfavor modifications and
favor foreclosure, see also Diane E. Thompson, Foreclosing Modifications: How
Servicer Incentives Discourage Loan Modifications, 86 WASH. L. REv. 755 (2011);
Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1
(2011).
13 From an economic efficiency perspective, however, we might want
[Vol. 24:4508
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that families and the communities they live in are better off with
somewhat higher costs of borrowing and less access to financing if
the result is that families avoid the trauma of losing homes and, in
many cases, the lives they had built around those homes.14 Making
home loans as cheap and attractive as possible should not be an
overriding social goal if the loans carry a significant risk of default.t 5
foreclosure to be a relatively low-cost procedure if underwriting standards and loan
origination practices were such that unaffordable or otherwise excessively risky
loans were not made and there were strong incentives for loan modifications when
housing prices substantially dropped. Where there are inadequate underwriting
standards and skewed incentives that work against reasonable modifications, there
is a case for costly foreclosures as a means of providing borrowers transitional
relief in the form of time in the residence and as a means of encouraging
modifications of loans. For a proposal for reforming the residential mortgage
market along these lines, see David A. Dana, A Simple Approach To Preventing
The Next Housing Crisis, HUFFINGTONPOsT.COM (Dec. 31, 2010), ,
www.huffingtonpost.com/david-a-dana/a-simple-approach-to-prev_b_803092.html;
see also George Soros, Denmark Offers A model Mortgage Market, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 10, 2008), available at online.wsj.com/article/SB 122360660328622015.html.
14 As Levitin & Twomey, supra note 12, at 5-6, explain:
Foreclosures increase housing supply and push down housing
prices, affecting neighboring homeowners' property values and
eroding property tax bases. This effect, in turn, hurts neighbors
who have to bear either higher taxes or reduced services.
Foreclosures also force families to relocate. Because many social
ties are geographically based, foreclosures sever these ties.
Children have to change schools, severing friendships;
congregants are cut off from their houses of worship; even
medical care and employment relationships are affected, as
relocation can render commutes impracticable. And foreclosures
contribute to . urban blight and public health problems.
Foreclosed properties often become centers of crime and arson,
and mosquitoes breeding in stagnant water in untended
swimming pools on foreclosed properties have even been linked
to the spread of the West Nile virus.
15 If mortgage formalities do and should matter in the "real world," then they
should also matter in the world of law schools, where, traditionally, first-year
required Property classes devoted almost no attention to them. If nothing else, legal
academics have it within their power to remedy that omission. A good place to start
would be the leading Property casebooks, which have not yet engaged with what
the foreclosure crisis has taught us about the importance of so-called mortgage
formalities. For example, the topic of foreclosures and foreclosure procedures is not
extensively addressed in the leading casebook, JESSE E. DUKEMINIER, JAMES
KRIER, GREGORY ALEXANDER & MICHAEL SCHILL, PROPERTY, (Wolters Kluwer,
7th ed. 2010).
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I. THREE STORIES OF THE COURTS AND MORTGAGE
FORMALITIES
A. The Context for the Stories
To better understand what is meant by "mortgage
formalities," it may be helpful to distinguish between (1) the
falsification question, i.e., whether the foreclosing party made false
representations in required documents or pleadings; and (2) the
standing question, which is whether the foreclosing party has met the
procedural requirements for standing to foreclose. The standing
question inquiry is whether the foreclosing party has identified and
obtained, by assignment or otherwise, the mortgage and/or note for
the property that is the subject of the foreclosure. The questions of
falsification and standing become entwined when the foreclosing
entity implicitly or explicitly falsely represents that it has the note or
mortgage that gives it proper standing to foreclose.
In spite of the vast number of recent foreclosures and the
suspected high percentage of some kind of failure to follow mortgage
formalities in these foreclosures, relatively few judicial opinions have
addressed the issue of mortgage formalities and the consequences of
noncompliance. This is likely because getting the courts to take
foreclosed homeowners seriously has been so difficult, even if the
homeowners have the money and resources to fight foreclosure. For
example, a recent New York Times story chronicled how one
homeowner with resources battled falsehoods by the foreclosinj
entity for seven years, only to have the court resolutely ignore him.
Opinions that do exist regarding the falsification question focus on
whether the foreclosing entity and/or its lawyers should be subject to
court sanctions, such as payment of fees.' 7 The courts also have been
compelled by a relatively few determined foreclosed-upon parties to
confront the question of whether the standing requirement for
foreclosing parties will be strictly enforced or glossed over in the
interest of allowing litigation (and by extension the market) to move
forward. Three standing decisions, which in effect are three stories of
16 Gretchen Morgenson, A Mortgage Tornado Warning Unheeded,
NYTIMES.COM (Feb. 4, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/business/mortgage-tornado-warning-
unheeded.html?ref gretchenmorgenson.
17 See, e.g., Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Bradbury, 32 A.3d 1014 (Me. 2011)
(upholding trial court's decision not to hold loan servicer in contempt and not to
award attorneys fees, despite the court's recognition that the servicer's attorney
intentionally made false statements in its pleadings).
510 [Vol. 24:4
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property owners, help illustrate the range of judicial responses to the
standing question and provide a basis for reflecting further on why
mortgage formalities matter. These three cases are U.S. Bank
National Association v. Ibanez, 1 JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Harp,19
and Tina v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.20
Before analyzing these three cases, one should consider some
background legal concepts: (1) the differences among judicial and
non-judicial power of sale and strict foreclosure; (2) the difference
between a mortgage and a note, as well as the corresponding
difference between chain-of-title in a mortgage and chain-of-title in a
note; and (3) the role of the pooling and servicing agreements
("PSA") in the servicing of mortgages that have been pooled as part
of securitization.
A large number of states allow "power of sale" foreclosures,
which are non-judicial foreclosures that are essentially bank-
conducted. In these jurisdictions, the foreclosing entity need not file a
complaint in court and wade through the litigation of a case before
the foreclosure sale actually happens. The power of sale refers to a
clause in the mortgage and note documents in which the borrower
agrees ahead of time to a private, non-judicial foreclosure.
Homeowners can sue to stay or set aside a foreclosure in these
jurisdictions, but they must take the initiative to bring an action in
court.2'
In judicial foreclosure and strict foreclosure jurisdictions, the
foreclosing entity must bring a court action to foreclose upon a
property. These forms of foreclosure involve a host of procedural
requirements associated with filing court papers and appearing before
a judge. As a result, judicial foreclosure is widely perceived to be
slower and more expensive for foreclosing entities. 22 From the
18 U.S. Bank Nat'1 Ass'n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011).
19 JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Harp, 10 A.3d 718 (Me. 2011).
20 Tina v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc, No. 08 CV 1233 JM (NLS), 2008
WL 4790906 (S. D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2008).
21 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCING LAW,
(West Group, 2001).
22 See id.; see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 15. In fact, foreclosures are
taking longer on average during this foreclosure crisis in judicial foreclosure states,
as compared to non-judicial ones. See Steve Cook, Happier Days On The Way For
Judicial States, BIGGERPOCKETS.COM (Feb. 1, 2012),
http://www.biggerpockets.com/renewsblog/2012/02/01/foreclosure-update-happier-
.days-on-the-way-for-judicial-states/?utm-source=feedburner&utm-medium=feed&
utm-campaign=Feed%3A+RealEstateNewsForReal+%28Real+Estate+News+For+
Real+|+A+BiggerPockets+Blog%29 (explaining that foreclosures have taken the
longest in judicial foreclosure. states, with New York properties taking "an average
5112012]
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perspective of "clearing the backlog of mortgages in default," it
would make sense to advocate for non-judicial foreclosure in
jurisdictions that currently do not allow it. But from the formalities-
matter perspective, quite the opposite is true: judicial foreclosure is
preferable because it provides borrowers more protections and sends
a message that the law considers dislocation from the home an
important enough action that it always deserves some overt "due
process" in a court.23 Moreover, judicial foreclosure is preferable
because it ex ante discourages investments where there is a
significant risk of foreclosure by ex post increasing the costs of
foreclosure. For instance, San Francisco County, which is in the
power-of-sale state of California, recently completed an audit of
foreclosures and found that "clear violations of law" were not just
commonplace but were considered the norm. Indeed, the report cast
doubt on "the validity of almost every foreclosure it examined." 24
At the same time, we do not have similarly rigorous reviews
of foreclosures in judicial foreclosure states, so we cannot assume
that the pervasiveness of "clear violations of law" is less in those
states than it is in power-of-sale states. As the three cases discussed
below show, the courts' attitudes toward procedural requirements can
matter enormously in ascertaining whether the requirements really
have meaning in practice. Thus, the effective protections for
homeowners in judicial sale jurisdictions may be no greater than they
are in power-of-sale jurisdictions. However, because judicial
foreclosure brings every foreclosure into the system, and non-judicial
foreclosure leaves the bulk of foreclosures involving non-litigating
borrowers outside the scope of judicial review, the potential for
meaningful judicial review - assuming a willing and resource-
equipped judiciary - is greatest in judicial foreclosure states.
When one buys property with third-party financing, one
invariably signs a mortgage and a note, both of which may create
rights of recovery against the property in the event of default. Both
mortgages and notes are assignable interests. Since both the mortgage
and note are at issue in a foreclosure and in theory should be
extinguished by the foreclosure (unless there is a separate claim for a
of 1,019 days to complete foreclosure - the longest of any state.").
23 There is precedent for the proposition that non-judicial foreclosure, as
opposed to judicial foreclosure, does not implicate the constitutional guarantee of
due process. See, e.g., Apao v. New York, 324 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2003).
24 Gretchen Morgenson, Audit Uncovers Extensive Flaws In Foreclosures,
N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 15, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/business/california-audit-finds-broad-
irregularities-in-foreclosures.html.
512 [Vol. 24:4
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deficiency judgment), the standing requirement would seem to
compel the foreclosing party to hold both the mortgage and note.
However, as a result of the housing boom, the rise in more
complicated securitization, sloppy servicing, and the embrace of the
now somewhat infamous Mortgage Electronic Registration Service
by financial institutions,2 5 the servicers of mortgages in default
sometimes cannot identify who owns the mortgage or the note at any
given point in time, including the point at which the power-of-sale
foreclosure process or the foreclosure judicial action commences. As
commentators have observed, the unresolved chain-of-title problem
in both notes and mortgages appears to be immense.26
In the "old days" of residential mortgage financing, the
relevant players with respect to the secured credit on a home were
simply "the bank" and "the borrower." The bank originated the
mortgage, serviced it, and owned it. The bank rationally would agree
to significant loan modification, even principal reduction, in order to
avoid foreclosure where housing prices had dropped substantially
since the origination of the mortgage. That has all changed. Now,
with respect to the secured credit on a single home, there are a host of
actors with an economic interest in whether, or how, the loan is paid
back, modified, or both. Mortgages now are most often pooled and
then serviced by an entity that holds no direct or indirect interest in
the mortgage or mortgages in the pool. The nexus between a servicer
(most often a major bank) and the owners of interest in the pool of
mortgages that back various forms of securities is the pooled servicer
agreement, or PSA.
The number and variety of investors in pools of first
mortgages can make identifying who has a stake in any given
mortgage quite challenging. In recent years, the securities in each
pool have been divided into different "tranches" with different credit-
risk ratings and different rights to payments from the borrowers.
Tranching has occurred in a dizzying variety of ways, but typically,
for each pool, there are senior, intermediate or mezzanine, and junior
tranches. The lower tranches, moreover, typically have been re-
securitized through the use of collateralized mortgage obligations
("CMOs") or collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs"). CMOs and
25 See Nolan Robinson, The Case Against Allowing Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) To Initiate Foreclosure Proceedings, 32
CARDozo L. REV. 1621 (2011) (exploring the division in the case law between
courts that recognize MERS as having standing and those that do not, and arguing
for the latter approach).
26 See, e.g., Adam Levitin, Ibanez and Securitization Fail, CREDrr SLIPS (Jan.
10, 2012), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/01/ibanez.html.
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CDOs then often have been tranched and securitized in the form of a
CMO2 or CDO2, and then sometimes these instruments in turn have
been tranched and securitized, and on and on. By virtue of the
financial alchemy of Wall Street, a single mortgage could be -and
often has been - transformed into tens, hundreds, or even thousands
of distinct investment interests. Finally, for many properties, a second
mortgage was originated at the same time as the first mortgage in
order to allow the borrower to avoid mortgage insurance
requirements.
B. Three Cases
The first of the cases highlights how easy it is for standing
and other questions about the foreclosing party's case go ignored,
especially in power-of-sale jurisdictions where foreclosure generally
is finalized without any court involvement. In U.S. Bank National
Association v. Ibanez, U.S. Bank foreclosed on two residential
mortgages, invoking the power of sale clauses in the mortgages. As
often happens, the foreclosing party bought the two homes at the
foreclosure sale. Because U.S. Bank had published its foreclosure
notice in a Boston paper rather than the paper for the city where the
properties were located (Springfield, a working-call city in central
Massachusetts), U.S. Bank filed an action seeking a declaration of
valid title to the properties. The homeowners whose homes had been
sold at foreclosure did not appear. But the judge then surprised U.S.
Bank, sua sponte finding that it lacked title to the mortgages at the
time of foreclosure and that the sales therefore were invalid. ' If U.S.
Bank had not felt that it had made an error in its publication choice
and had not gone to court for a confirmation of good title, or had the
judge passively issued a default judgment, the chain-of-title problems
with these mortgages never would have come to light.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that U.S.
Bank had indeed failed to establish it had been assigned the
mortgages at issue prior to issuing the foreclosure notice and
conducting the foreclosure sale. The Court took very seriously what
might be dismissed as a mortgage formality, the statutory
requirement that the notice of foreclosure and the sale be undertaken
only by the "the mortgagee or his executors, administrators,
successors or assigns."28 U.S. Bank's argument boiled down to (1)
the assertion that its documentation was close enough to show that it
27 U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 55 (Mass. 2011).
28 "Statutory power of sale" in mortgage, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183, §
21 (West 2011).
514 [Vol. 24:4
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had been assigned the mortgage by the time the foreclosure notices
were published, and, in the alternative, that (2) any prior defect was
cured when the mortgages were assigned to U.S. Bank after the
foreclosure sales. The Court rejected the "close enough". assertion,
explaining that neither an unexecuted private placement
memorandum nor an unsigned PSA sufficed to establish that U.S.
Bank held the mortgages when it noticed the foreclosures. The Court
noted that U.S. Bank could not point to any specific mention of either
mortgage in the schedules attached to either document. 29 Moreover,
there was a lack of documentation for previous alleged assignments
of the mortgages in the alleged chains of title.30 With respect to the
post-foreclosure assignments to U.S. Bank, the Court rejected the
argument that "postforeclosure assignment be treated as a
preforeclosure assignment simply by declaring an 'effective date' that
precedes the notice of sale and foreclosure." 31 The concurring justices
bemoaned "the utter carelessness with which the plaintiff banks
documented the titles to their assets." 32
The next two cases are in contrast to Ibanez, in which the trial
court judge insisted that the foreclosing entity prove ownership of the
mortgage even in the absence of a complaining homeowner. JP
Morgan Chase v Harp and Tina v. Countrywide Home Loans
involved property owners who battled foreclosing entities without the
assistance of a lawyer and who found the courts essentially
uninterested in the standing question. The courts in these cases paid
little heed to the arguments that the pro se plaintiffs tried to articulate
and dismissed the foreclosing entities' inability to establish chain-of-
title as substantively important. Because Harp involved a strict
foreclosure state, and another, Tina, a non-judicial foreclosure state,
the two cases again illustrate that the form of foreclosure may matter
less than the attitude of the courts.
In Harp, Chase filed a foreclosure action on a home, but at the
time the foreclosure complaint was filed, Chase had not yet been
assigned the mortgage. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reasoned
that because Chase was assigned the mortgage by the time it filed
summary judgment, and because Harp did not raise the
standing/assignment issue before that time in the litigation, Chase's
lack of ownership of the mortgage when it filed for foreclosure was
essentially unimportant: "JP Morgan's late acquisition of the
29 Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 52.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 54.
32 Id. at 55.
2012] 515
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mortgage did not change the cause of action or prejudice Harp." 33
The Court seemed unconcerned that it was making the case turn on a
pro se litigant's delay in raising the standing issue. Indeed, the Court
explained that "[w]e do not afford Harp special consideration as a pro
se litigant."3 4
In Tina, property owners sued after their property was sold at
foreclosure pursuant to a power-of-sale provision. Countrywide did
not provide a copy of the original note at the time of the foreclosure
notice or sale, and as far as one can tell from the opinion, it had not
been assigned the note prior to foreclosure. Nonetheless, the Court
held that under California law, proof that the foreclosing entity holds
the note is unnecessary for a power of sale foreclosure. 3 Read
literally, the opinion seems to sanction foreclosures by entities that
never have and never will acquire the original note related to the
property. The Court swept away Tina's other arguments as
unsupported by statutory authority or adequate factual allegations.
II. WHAT Do THE STORIES MEAN?
On one account,. these three cases just involve technicalities
about assignment of notes and mortgages, and so they mean nothing.
The property owners in all three cases had defaulted, so what
difference do the technicalities make? This view was expressed in a
reader comment to a New York Times story on the mortgage mess:
Did the Bank mess it up? Yes. Does that change the fact
that the homeowner is in fact not paying their mortgage and
came to foreclosure regardless of the paperwork? Nope ...
This is like beating a speeding ticket because the officer's
handwriting made the State look like NV instead of NY.36
One thing wrong with this view is that one does not truly
know whether the property owners owed what the servicers claim
they did. The Harps and the Tinas, at least, seemed to dispute this,
and for all anyone knows, the defaulting property owners in Ibanez
would also have disputed the amount owed if they had the resources
to fight the foreclosure themselves. That servicers would play so fast
and loose with the assignment of notes and mortgages does not
33 JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Harp, 10 A.3d 718, 721 (Me. 2011).
34 Id. at 721 n.6.
3 Tina v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc, No. 08 CV 1233 JM (NLS), 2008
WL 4790906, at *8 (S. D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2008).
36 Source on file with author.
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inspire confidence in the overall servicing of the mortgages,
including the proper accounting of what is owed. Insistence on strict
compliance of servicers with procedural requirements might give
leverage to homeowners who need a reasonable modification of their
loans but who, literally, cannot get their phone calls returned or
answered by anyone with proper training or an incentive to be
helpful.
Still, in many instances of foreclosures that are completed
without the "mortgage formalities," the foreclosures eventually
would have happened even if there had been judicial insistence on
strict compliance. That does not mean, however, that insistence on
strict compliance lacks meaning. One clear meaning of strict
compliance would be that the legal system takes seriously not just the
interests of wealthy corporations but also, and equally, those of
struggling homeowners. Another related meaning would be that the
legal system demands as much from lawyers for major financial
institutions as it does for lawyers for "regular" people. When a
lawyer files a foreclosure complaint that contains or implies a
falsehood, such as suggesting that the filing party owns the note and
mortgage at issue when that may not be true or is unknown, that
lawyer is breaching a basic professional duty and should be
sanctioned. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and corresponding
state rules provide for sanctions for lying to the court, either through
direct misstatement or omission. Nevertheless, courts are hesitant to
impose sanctions even in cases of falsification. This hesitation
implies a relative de-valuation of the foreclosed-upon homeowners
and the norm of legal equality. Consider a relatively recent report
from Florida, a hotbed of foreclosure abuse:
Florida courthouses are rife with evidence of errors and
fabrications made by attorneys handling foreclosure cases,
and yet so far no lawyers have been disciplined.
With pressure mounting to police its own members, the
Florida Bar established a special category of complaints
listed as "foreclosure fraud."
But in 20 complaints investigated in that category, the Bar
has not found cause to discipline anyone-even lawyers
who admitted to breaking ethical rules.
Some observers say that early track record of ignoring
misdeeds by its members raises questions about whether
the system of self-policing for lawyers can handle the depth
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of wrongdoing in the foreclosure crisis.
The complaints have been filed by judges, lawyers,
homeowners and the Florida Bar itself, and reflect the
issues seen in courtrooms almost daily for the past two
years, including forged signatures and backdated
documents used to improperly seize homes in foreclosures.
In addition, attorneys for lenders have filed false motions,
left out important information that would hurt their case, or
skipped mandatory mediations and court hearings.
The state Attorney General's Office has investigated and
found the same evidence of wrongdoing. But with no
known criminal investigations launched into the behavior,
the public and the court system must rely on the Florida
Bar to stop bad behavior by attorneys. 37
Courts (not to mention state bar authorities) are often hesitant
to wade into the arena of sanctions. But contrast the lax attitude
toward slipshod and deceptive lawyering on behalf of major financial
institutions with the attitude embodied in the Private Securities
Litigation Act ("PSLA"), which is a statute addressing instances
when it is major financial institutions (as well as other major
corporations) that are being sued. Under the PSLA, sanctions are
mandatory when a lawyer for aggrieved shareholders files a
fraudulent or frivolous pleading.38 Moreover, the courts have taken
the mandate to sanction very seriously and have broadly construed it.
In the securities litigation context, close enough is not treated as good
enough.
The broader meaning of Ibanez, too, may be that the
aggressive securitization of residential mortgages comes at a cost,
and that cost may not be worth the social benefit, at least with respect
to most categories of residential mortgages. The facts of Ibanez
suggest that, in the complex dance of transferring, pooling, dividing,
re-dividing and retransferring interests in mortgages, no one may be
able to coherently speak for the "owner" or "owners" of the
mortgage. Servicers may have the freedom to proceed serving their
own parochial interests, which may include not hiring the necessary
3 Todd Ruger, Foreclosure lawyers' misdeeds ignored in Fla.?, HERALD-
TRIB., (Jan. 18, 2011),
http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20110118/ARTICLE/101181061.
38 Private securities litigation, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (c)(2).
518 [Vol. 24:4
Why Mortgage "Formalities" Matter
staff to handle loan modifications and also may include resisting the
only kind of loan modification that could save the loan from
foreclosure - namely, principal reduction. 39 But to be fair to
servicers, the confusion engendered by the aggressive securitization
of the sort witnessed during the housing boom also may make it
difficult for a faithful-agent servicer to discern exactly who would
have to be contacted and give permission to a loan modification at
any given point in time.4 0 In this view, the carelessness the Justices
criticized in Ibanez may not be an aberration but rather a systemic
attribute of aggressive securitization. Indeed, the San Francisco
County report found that almost half the properties claimed at
foreclosure by beneficiaries of the deeds of trusts were in fact "a
'stranger' to the deed of trust."41 By penalizing servicers as well as
investors in mortgages for such carelessness, the courts can push the
industry away from its current form and practices of securitization
and encourage the.holding of loans or a greater part of each loan by
the originating financial institution. In the least, the courts may
39 See Dana, supra note 12, at 104 ("Because the servicer of a mortgage does
not own any part of the mortgages it services, its only source of revenue related to
the mortgages is a fee it obtains from investors in the pool of securitized mortgages,
and these fees are generally based on the principal of the serviced mortgages.
Servicers thus have a strong interest in not modifying loans in such a way as to
reduce principal and hence reduce fees, even when doing so might be the only way
to avoid foreclosures and might be exactly what economically rational servicers
would do if they also owned the mortgages they serviced. Because PSA contracts
also generally provide that servicers must cover payments to investors in the
mortgage pool after the mortgages go into default and up until the properties are
foreclosed upon, cash-strapped servicers also have an incentive to push mortgages
in default to foreclosure. The fact that servicers are compensated for all expenses of
foreclosure, including whatever various fees they tack on, also may lead them to
proceed readily to foreclosure.").
40 See id. ("Even when servicers want to aggressively pursue meaningful loan
modifications, including ones involving principal, the inability to coordinate and
obtain consent from all the relevant investors may result in paralysis or at best
halfway measures. Many PSA contracts require a supermajority or even unanimous
consent of all interest holders in a mortgage in order to allow a modification of the
loan. Even when that is not the case, servicers reasonably may fear liability if they
act without broad consent. Investors in senior-most tranches have no reason to
support loan modification because they have priority and will recover on their
investment even with foreclosure, while those in the most junior tranches have no
reason to support modification because they will receive nothing once a schedule of
significantly reduced payments is in place. Of course, some "in the middle"
investors may benefit from meaningful modifications but that hardly makes for
unanimity or a supermajority of investors.").
41 See Morgenson, supra note 24.
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encourage more thoughtful mechanisms for use in securitization,
including better PSAs, and more investments in maintaining a
reliable system of mortgage and note registration and their
assignments.
A final implication of Ibanez and other decisions insisting on
adherence to mortgage formalities may be that a significant tradition
in Anglo-American property law remains alive, if not dominant.
When courts insist on mortgage formalities and thereby create a
disincentive for the intense fragmentation of interests in mortgages,
they operate within Anglo-American law's tradition of combating
excessive fragmentation of property interests. There is no "anti-
fragmentation principle" as such in our estate law tradition, but there
are a number of doctrines that have been justified on the basis of
enhancing the alienability and especially the efficient market
alienability of land. These doctrines enhance alienability precisely by
limiting fragmentation of interests in land. The implicit premise of
these doctrines - as they have come to be justified, however obscure
and contested their historical origins may be - is that private actors
may not splinter property into so many fragments that they preclude
value-maximizing decision making regarding the use and disposition
of land.
The first such doctrine is that ambiguous grants or devises
should be read as creating a fee simple in land. Another doctrine that
is consistent with an anti-fragmentation principle is the doctrine of
worthier title. The final estate doctrine that advances an anti-
fragmentation principle is the common law rule against perpetuities.
This rule operates to override even a clear expression of intent on the
part of the grantor when the grant fragments the interest in property
so as to create distant, uncertain contingent remainders. Interests that
violate the rule are simply "crossed out," with the result that the
overall fragentation of property in land is reduced and alienability
increased.
42 See Dana, supra note 12, at 111-12 ("State property law, via statutes, has
expressed an antifragmentation principle most clearly in the context of oil and gas
field development. Indeed, in this arena the law has overridden firm property rights
expectations and contracts in the name of preventing a socially important asset
from being inefficiently developed. The'state and federal courts, in this context,
have accepted that where existing property rights rules and private ordering result
in too many parties with an interest in the same resource, the law has a legitimate
role in coercing the multiple interest holders to act in a more unified, and hence
(from an overall return on private investment perspective) rational, manner.").
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III. WHY Do SOME COURTS TAKE MORTGAGE FORMALITIES
SERIOUSLY AND OTHERS NOT?
One obvious lesson from reflecting on the Ibanez, Harp, and
Tina cases is that courts vary in how seriously they take mortgage
formalities. This raises the interesting question of why. It does not
appear that positive state law, namely precedents and statutes,
determines the level of seriousness with which mortgage formalities
are taken, as witnessed by the fact that in California and elsewhere,
courts within the same state have taken seemingly opposite
approaches.43 Variables that might be factors in enforcing mortgage
formalities include the local housing market and default levels and
judicial ideology. In states with crushing default rates, perhaps judges
are more likely to ignore formalities. There is no doubt that avoiding
crushing workloads would be a rational (although in my view,
undesirable) reason for why courts would ignore devoting energy to
mortgage formalities. For that reason, one might expect that
jurisdictions with the most extreme default levels (such as Florida
and Nevada) would be ones where the courts disregard mortgage
formalities. A recent report in New York, for example, explains that
New York courts adopted a new rule in 2010 to try to repair what its
chief judge called "a deeply flawed process."44 The rule required
lawyers who pursued foreclosure suits to file a certification stating
that they had personally checked the accuracy of the claims
concerning a homeowner's loan. The New York courts are struggling
to process a backlog of tens of thousands of foreclosures that have
been filed with such certifications and are striving to do so in a way
that holds the certifying lawyers accountable. At the same time,
thousands of "shadow" foreclosure actions have been initiated. In
shadow foreclosure actions, borrowers are intimidated into reaching a
deal with the bank before the process reaches the point at which
certification is required. Thus, the New York courts must struggle
with what to do about shadow foreclosures. The judges in some other
states may conclude that they simply cannot bear the cost of policing
compliance with mortgage formalities.
Judicial ideology also may play a part in the different
43 See David R. Greenberg, Neglecting Formalities In The Mortgage
Assignment Process And The Resulting Effects On Residential Foreclosures, 83
TEMPLE L. REv. 253, 275 (2010) (discussing the tensions in California law).
44 William Glaberson, Push To Avert Foreclosures Hits Court Logjam, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/09/nyregion/push-to-avert-
foreclosures-hits-court-logj am.html?pagewanted=all.
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responses. Perhaps Democratic-leaning judges behave differently
than Republican-leaning ones. Or perhaps party affiliation does not
capture the important ideological divides. Another possible variable
is whether the relevant judges are elected or appointed. Another
reason that courts have varied may be because the judges in different
states have different conceptions of themselves relative to the other
branches and levels of government. Some judges may well say to
themselves, figuratively if not literally, that other institutions of
government are better equipped to address the foreclosure crisis and
ensure it will not be repeated. But other judges, in a more activist
tradition, might feel that they should not tolerate wrong behavior and
that their role is, in effect, to lead if no other institution is taking
responsibility. Thus, one might expect that courts more generally
deemed "activist" might behave differently than those thought not to
be "activist."
From a social scientific perspective, in the realm of the
sociology of courts, the foreclosure crisis can be envisioned as a
natural experiment in why courts differ in their response to the same
social phenomenon. A tremendous amount of social science in the
legal academy is now devoted to how differences in ideology and
background lead judges - and especially federal appellate judges - to
rule differently in the same kinds of cases. Trial level courts have
received less attention, as by-and-large have the state courts, even
though state courts have greater involvement than federal courts in
the lives of most individuals and households. The housing crisis and
the judicial response would be a good place to address this imbalance
in social science research.
IV. A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT (OR WHY THE COURTS CAN
MAKE A REAL DIFFERENCE)
Finally, I would like to address the "why us?" objection to my
claim that state courts should take mortgage formalities seriously.
The essence of this objection is that other institutions - Congress, the
federal Executive, state attorneys general - are better equipped to
address the structural problems at the heart of the foreclosure crisis,
of which the failure to follow mortgage formalities is only one
component. Constrained to taking one case at a time, the state
judiciary may be too weak an actor to make any real difference,
according to this view.
It is certainly true that federal legislative and regulatory
initiatives could have a major impact, and there has been no shortage
of thoughtful, and, in some cases, bold, proposals. The state attorneys
[Vol. 24:4522
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general also have been active in this arena. But no legislation has
emerged or seems likely to emerge from Congress. The Obama
Administration efforts have been widely seen as too little, too late.
Moreover, it remains unclear whether state attorney generals, in a
nationwide settlement or additional actions, will impose really
meaningful penalties on servicers and provide them with a strong
enough incentive to change their behavior.
State courts have some advantages relative to the other
institutions of government in addressing the foreclosure crisis. In
contrast to federal actors, state courts are on the front lines. Hence,
they are well-positioned to observe and blow the whistle on deceptive
and slipshod foreclosure practices and the harms they entail.
Furthermore, judges, even those who face periodic election, have
greater political insulation from interest groups' lobbying than more
overtly political actors at the state or federal level. To the extent that
the federal legislative or regulatory response to the foreclosure crisis
has been too tepid because of the outsized political power of the
major banks, state courts, for all their limitations, have greater
freedom to act.
A simple thought experiment illustrates the potential power of
state courts. Imagine that every state judge in each state had acted
like the trial court judge in Ibanez, who demanded proof that the
foreclosing entity owned the mortgage and then set aside the
foreclosure because there was no proof. What if every judge who had
reason to believe that foreclosure mills were filing false certifications
had simply blocked every foreclosure until evidence was provided
that the foreclosures were proper? What would have happened? In
effect, there would have been a partial mortgage moratoria. A
tremendous number of news stories and a flood of television
coverage would have followed, and state attorney generals, not
wanting to be left out of the limelight, would have launched or
stepped up investigations. Moreover, the major servicers, the major
banks, would have been under pressure to strike a reform deal with
the state attorney generals and federal regulators as a way of both
appeasing and circumventing the state judges. As a result, there might
have been a swifter and stronger response to the servicers' disregard
for "mortgage formalities," and society, especially struggling
homeowners, might have been better off as a result. In sum, state
judges might have made a real difference. Moreover, they still could
if, when faced with the many foreclosure actions that the banks will
surely bring in the next few years, they insist, like the trial court
judge in Ibanez, that borrowers and banks alike must enjoy the full
protections afforded by law.
